The EU lacks the legal ideology as a social instrument that could satisfy the spirit of liberal democracy and would help to consolidate different societies to a solid European demos. Although the existence of an ideological system alone does not guarantee social consensus, it helps to manage dissension within the limits of particular values and norms. It is because a legal ideology provides the structure for social thought that individuals and social groups are able to interpret the nature of emerging conflicts and the interests they support.
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional systems of the European Union (hereinafter -the EU) Member States and their legal practice as well as their culture of legal interpretation -their constitutionalism -concern the same object: rules concerning independent self-governing political community and fundamental human rights. As
G. Nolte notes:
'European constitutionalism' seems to embody something, which is both more removed from 'the people' and more vague than national constitutional law. (…)
The development of European integration, however, has started to make these clear-cut differences disappear. This is not only because a European entity is developing which more closely resembles a state. It is also because the European states themselves and their characteristic constitutionalisms are being transformed by the process of European integration. This is visible most clearly in the jurisprudence of the European Courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. 1 However, today the EU is in the deepest crisis since its establishment. This fact raises new challenges for European constitutionalism. This crisis has many factors and faces but the main problem is the absence of clear strategic guidelines for the further development of the EU. This situation is mainly caused by the intensification of globalisation processes and growing internal and external threats. External threats such as poverty of the Third World countries, increasing international terrorism and militaristic attempts of particular states that violate international law fosters global flows of migrants, refugees and asylum applicants. In terms of security, the prevention of complex external threats requires not only additional investment, but also has a significant negative impact on the condition of the EU Member States' social values, which are still fragile after the financial and economic crisis.
At the very beginning of the twenty-first century I. Pernice stressed that the contemporary state:
is unable on its own to fulfil certain tasks of common interest, such as the preservation of liberty, peace, security and welfare of their citizens. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017
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Barak's legal ideology that could be relevant for the formation of European demos and constitutionalism.
In order to achieve this aim, the research is focused on the issues that emerge in the area of three main pillars of constitutionalism: (1) adherence to the rule of law, (2) limited and accountable government, and (3) protection of fundamental rights. 12 We believe that contemporary legal ideology should be based on an interpretation of these pillars that is understandable for all members of society.
THE DISOBEDIENCE OF RULES AS A THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
Why is disobeying rules considered a threat to the rule of law and democracy?
There are many answers to this question. However, we believe that it was comprehensively answered by F. A. Hayek's deep analysis of the nature of rules and order 13 , which stresses the necessity to free ourselves wholly from the erroneous conception that there can first be a society which then gives itself laws.
This erroneous conception is basic to the constructivist rationalism from Descartes and Hobbes through Rousseau and Bentham to contemporary legal positivism.
According to Hayek, it is only as a result of individuals observing certain common rules that a group of people can live together in those orderly relations, which we call a society. Individuals differing in their general values may occasionally agree on, and effectively collaborate for, the achievement of particular concrete purposes.
But such agreement on particular ends will never suffice for forming that lasting order which we call a society. 14 Thus, the social order is characteristic to any society and functions only if common (social) rules are observed. There is as much society as its members (are able to) follow the common rules of conduct.
The obedience of common rules and especially the rules of security not only According to H. J. Berman, these two purposes of law -protection of order and implementation of justice -which lie within the Western legal tradition, are engaged in an inner conflict. The order itself is perceived as something that includes an internal tension between the need for change and the need to maintain stability. Justice is also being treated dialectically. It involves the tension between individual rights and public welfare. 17 These tensions in society may increase if authorities, while implementing their interests, unadvisedly contrast order and justice. This situation traditionally leads to the state of war. 18 Therefore, public authority usually aims to foster obedience to common rules by means of purposeful creation and implementation of a particular legal ideology.
In this case "particular legal ideology" means that it not only avoids confrontation with the legal psychology of social groups. Instead, the legal ideology relies on legal psychology and purposefully fosters a trust in law and justice. However, the role of legal ideology has notably changed in the second half of the twentieth century. Recently, the EU is coping with the refugee crisis that is complicated by the fact that the people of the EU Member States barely trust the ability of the EU law ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017
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and authorities to guarantee the balance between public order and justice, which is especially fragile when the level of security decreases. Thus, the crisis of the EU and its constitutionalism is influenced by inter alia the crisis of the obedience to legal rules and the very concept of the rule of law.
In order to restore public trust in law and to uphold the compliance with the rules we have to use a modern legal ideology that justifies the idea of the rule of law. It is therefore necessary to rely on the experience of those countries which operate under conditions of active external threats at the same time as preserving the integrity of society and its identity since the rule of law and the maintenance of public identity are the two sides of the same social process. Therefore, the EU could take an example from modern legal ideology of Israel, which is greatly influenced by the jurisprudential ideas of Aharon Barak.
The idea of the rule of law as the law of rules and the rule of values is one of the central ideas of Barak's constitutional theory. He distinguishes three aspects of the rule of law: formal rule of law, jurisprudential rule of law, and substantive rule of law. Although these aspects overlap, there are substantial differences among them:
Formal rule of law means that everyone in the country -individuals, corporations, and arms of the state -must act according to law, and unlawful activity must meet with the organized sanction of society. Rule of law, in this sense, has a double meaning, extending to both the legality of the rule and the rule of the law. (…) Rule of law in this sense is not related to the quality of the regime but rather the principle of public order. 23 The jurisprudential approach to the rule of law stresses the minimum requirements that a legal system needs in order to exist. They discern the legal system from the gang whose leader imposes its will on everyone else. Here the approaches of various legal scholars vary. In developing a system of interpretation, 
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He describes the substantive rule of law as:
The rule of law that constitutes the proper balance between, on the one hand, society's need for political independence, social equality, economic development, and domestic order, and, on the other hand, the needs of the individual, his or her personal liberty, and his or her human dignity. 26 He maintains, that the "rule of law is not just public order. It is social justice based on social order." 27 Thus, Barak reminds us that law not only has a formal (technical), but also a value-based aspect where the highest values are human rights and the needs of society. Their balance can manage the emerging conflict between order and justice.
THE ENTRENCHMENT OF UNDERSTANDING OF COMMERCIALIZED DEMOCRACY AS A THREAT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
One of the fundamental elements of the concept of constitutionalism is limited and accountable government. Only in a democratic society is it possible to achieve this. However, lately democratic processes are influenced by several factors that strengthen the tension between government and society.
The issues in this area may be traced in the neoliberal approach towards a government, when the public (state) sector is narrowed and broad opportunities for market mechanisms to operate in the public sector according to the principles elaborated in the private sector or market management are provided. It is based on the idea argued by the nineteenth-century political economy theorists that the public interest is satisfied only if it is allowed to express private interests freely.
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The implementation of this project of the "New Right" under conditions of a universal democracy, weak moral values and expanding legal nihilism led not only to the maintenance of the welfare state idea, but also caused a totally unexpected 25 Ibid., 246. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. In other words, the citizen is willing to obey the law, and the consumer tends to have more options for seeking benefits. This tendency is relevant not only to individuals as consumers but also to the EU Member States. Therefore, we observe the deficit of their solidarity.
The coalescence of liberal democracy and a free-market changes the structure of society: it becomes commercialised and its values become ambiguous. 31 For instance, the legal order and citizenship are perceived as an individual commodity, as an object of negotiation between the state and interest groups. This means that modern democracy has moved away from the concept of liberal democracy as found in the early twentieth century, as serving to build civil society. This democracy commercialism tends to be called post-democracy and is characterized by the following features: 1) devaluation of achievements of governmental institutions; 2) expanding privatization and commercialization of the public sector, particularly education, health care and other social services; 3) increasing role of transnational corporations and lobby groups in policy and legislation. 32 Here we observe the dangerous tendency of sociability loss or alienation. Democratic procedures chain the powers of management and control as well as responsibility, 29 Charles Taylor, Autentiškumo etika (The Ethics of Authenticity) (Vilnius: Aidai, 1996), 25-34. 30 In this context it should be noted that Barak discerns formal democracy as concerned with the electoral process governed by the majority and expressed in legislative supremacy, and substantive democracy as concerned with fundamental values and human rights. 33 He strongly disagrees that democracy is just a majority rule and emphasizes the morality of democracy, which is based on human dignity and equality of persons. 34 Thus, he calls us to strengthen the value-based approach towards democracy.
Although Barak admits the importance of other branches of government, the main role in maintaining the constitutional order and protection of democracy, the rule of law and human rights he assigns to courts and judges in particular. Barak attributes to judges two main roles: (1) bridging the gap between law (government) and society; (2) protection of the constitution and human rights and thus the maintenance of the coherence of the legal system as a whole. Analysis conducted by N. Baeten revealed that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) meets the judicial framework set forth by Barak:
The Court did not only protect the constitution and democracy, but it also actively engaged in enhancing the EU constitutional model and its democratic character (…). Similarly, the citizenship case law exemplifies the ways in which the Court has actively interpreted the Treaty provisions on citizenship so as to connect their wording to the social reality of EU citizens and, thereby, effectively bridging the gap between the law and life. a mistake of the judiciary in times of terrorism is worse than a mistake of the legislature and executive in times of terrorism. The reason is that the judiciary's mistakes will remain with the democracy when the threat of terrorism passes and will be entrenched in the case law of the court as a magnet for the development of new and problematic laws.
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A strong and independent judiciary is important for the government (be it national or transnational) so that it would not be able to manipulate the administration of justice and the rule of law. However, judges do not have to interfere in the democratic process and affect the will of people so that they could replace politics in political decision-making. 38 Here a balance is also needed. However, such imperatives as well as the common will and human rights are not possible without a society that bases its existence on the conscious individuals who freely decide to live together, rather than on individual egoism. 40 The consumerist approach as well as extended interpretation of human rights strengthens the tension between freedom and security.
BALANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE FACE OF
According to B. Buzan, most of the threats arise from the fact that people are living in a social environment which inevitably generates social, economic and political pressure. 41 Usually, we distinguish four types of social threats: physical threats (e.g. pain, injury, death etc.), economic threats (e.g. deprivation of property or destruction, deprivation of employment or resources etc.), threats to the rights (e.g. imprisonment, denial of human rights etc.) and the threat to status (e.g. public humiliation etc.). As a rule, these threats occur not alone, but together at once. They reveal a dilemma: how to balance an individual's freedom of action, so that it does not pose a real and potential threat to the freedoms of other individuals, or how to increase community freedom without increasing government oppression.
[ Contrary to the Europeans, who during the time of peace enjoyed a broad interpretation of human rights, due to repeatedly experienced large-scale attacks the Israeli people have become more willing to accept some limits to their freedom in return for greater protection. 46 Therefore, there is no surprise that Barak states that human rights are not absolute 47 and that not all rights are created equal in importance. 48 Human rights are the rights of a human being as a part of society. The rights of the individual must conform to the existence of society, the existence of a government, and the existence of national goals. The power of the state is essential to the existence of the state and the existence of human rights themselves. Therefore, limitations on human rights reflect a national compromise between the needs of the state and the rights of the individual. 49 The purposes that justify limitations on human rights are derived from the values on which society is founded. In a constitutional democracy, these values are ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017
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On the one hand, we must consider the values and principles relating to the One of the most significant works on proportionality is the one written by
Barak in which he focuses on the proportionality of a limitation applied within a democratic system, on a constitutional right by a law (a statute or the common law). 58 He derives proportionality as a constitutional concept from democracy, the balancing, which is relevant for the examination of the interpretation of a law whose purpose includes conflicting principles. The latter type of balancing deals with the interpretation (meaning) of the law and not with its constitutionality (validity). 63 Thus, he formulates the basic balancing rule as follows:
The more important it is to prevent marginal harm on the constitutional right, and the higher the probability such harm will occur, then the marginal benefit to the public interest (or to the protection of other persons' rights) required to justify such limits should be more socially important, more urgent, and more probable. 64 The balancing test is passed, and the limitation of a constitutional right is proportional stricto sensu if the harm caused to the right by the law does not exceed the benefit gained by it. 65 Although, according to Barak interpretation does not explain fully why proportionality should be preferred over other criteria that also strive to achieve constitutional unity, the interpretive explanation is of considerable weight 66 and it is reasonable to say that the principle of proportionality is often more significant than the other criteria, because it enables subjects with different thinking to seek a social consensus within the limits of the The pursuit of social consensus has its value-based limits within which liberal democracy can exist. Hence, it is necessary to look for a balance of classical sociocultural tensions between government and society, order and justice, and freedom and security, which can be achieved on the basis of the principle of proportionality.
Therefore, Barak's legal ideology focuses on a balance between public values and protection of human rights, and a commitment not only to human rights and freedoms but also to other social values, including public security, is highly relevant in the context of constitutionalism of the EU and its Member States.
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